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NOTES
Workmen's Compensation
OFF-PREMISES ASSAULTS - RECOVERY BY THE ASSAULTED
OR THE AGGRESSOR
Introduction
The Workmen's Compensation Acts are society's attempt to remedy
the new wrongs created by the prevalent economic system, industrialism,
the necessary operation of which results in numerous employee injuries
for which no fault can be found in the employer.' The acts compel the
profitting element in the industrialization, the employer, to care for the
injured employee as a necessary business expenditure. He, in turn, can
pass the burden to the public by increasing the price of his product.
At first glance, the application of the statutes seems quite simple.
Essentially, once the employer-employee status is established, the injured
employee is provided with an award as long as the injury or accident
can be related to his employment. 2 To use the terms of the typical
statute, the injury or accident must "arise out of and in the course of"
the employment. However, few phrases have proved as troublesome in
construction and have been the focal point of so much litigation. At
any rate, most courts do seem to agree that "arising out of" refers to
causal connection of the employment with the injury, while "in the
course of" indicates the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.3
The satisfaction of but one criterion is not sufficient for an award; most
jurisdictions require fulfillment of both.4
Some of the more troublesome cases of employee recovery occur
when the employee is involved in a violent act with another employee or
a third person. Here the "arising out of" or causal connection criterion
looms as a compensation preventive. Place the employee off the em-
ployer's premises at the time of the injury and the possibility of recovery
grows dimmer since this factual circumstance is confronted with the
"course of" criterion.
The purpose of this discussion is to examine the court's treatment of
cases within this area to determine the extent of recovery or its denial
and the reasoning therewith. Concurrently, an attempt will be made to
reflect and comment on the changing attitude of the courts in their
conception of the acts. Specifically, then, the obstacles confronting an
injured employee in this situation are attributable to the fact (1) that
he is off the premises, (2) is the victim of the violent act of another,
(3) which act may have-been motivated by the employee's own aggres-
sion.
1 All the states have enacted such legislation, Mississippi being the last in
1948. Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-01 (1952).
2 Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation,
12 L. Soc. J. 465, 479 (1947).
3 1 LARSON, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION, 41-42 (1952).
4 Horovitz, supra note 2, at 666.
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The Off-Premises Factor
Recovery for an assault which occurs off the employee's premises has,
in most cases, been extremely difficult. The evident presumption claimed
is that one's employment ends at the boundary of the employer's pro-
perty, and any injury occurring beyond that point does not arise in the
course of employment.5 This preventive is usually termed the "off-
premises" rule.
The immediate difficulty presented by the rule is one of definition, or
in other words, where precisely do the premises of the employer begin
and end for the purposes of the act. Early courts tended to limit the
term to the employer's property, holding that employment is suspended
when the employee leaves the place of his actual employment.6 Modern
authority would extend the term "premises" to include property leased
or used by him, 7 and even to employer-controlled parking lots.8 The
harsh results of a strict application of the off-premises rule have per-
suaded some jurisdictions to formulate a "zone of danger" exception. 9
If the employee, although off the employer's premises, is so close to the
scene of his labor as to be within the zone of its danger, he may be
compensated. However, notwithstanding these extensions, there still exists
a kind of sacredness in the employer's premises in its relation to the
"course of" employment.
It seems that courts adhere to the "course" test in off-premises cases
in order to keep compensation within their conception of rational
bounds. This proposition is exemplified by the case of Lampert v.
Siemons,'0 where an employee was assaulted by a striker while going to
work. The court refused compensation on the ground that the injury did
not arise in the course of employment. It said: "If the limits of his em-
ployment can be extended under such circumstances to cover the distance
between his home and the factory, why cannot those limits also be
extended to reach any place and any activity in which the workman may
be after working hours?" The court then held that the employment
ceased when the employee left the factory, thereby making the premises
the measure of employment.
A factual circumstance which has plagued the strict adherents of the
"course" criterion occurs when an altercation in direct relation to the
employment takes place on the premises but the assault is effectuated
after the victim has left the premises. In Field v. Charmette Knitted
Fabric Co.," where the assault occurred five feet from the premises,
5 Rourke's Case, 237 Mass. 360, 129 N.E. 603 (1921).
6 Lampert v. Siemons, 235 N.Y. 311, 139 N.E. 278 (1923); Rourke's Case,
supra note 5.
7 See Horovitz, supra note 2, at 673.
8 Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. England, 212 S.W.2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
See also Pickett v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ohio App. 372, 129 N.E.2d 639 (1954)(recovery allowed even though the parking lot was not considered on the premises).
9 Pickett v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ohio App. 372, 129 N.E.2d 639 (1954);
Baggett Transp. Co. v. Holderfield, 260 Ala. 56, 68 So. 2d 21 (1953).
10 235 N.Y. 311, 139 N.E. 278, 279 (1923).
11 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642 (1927).
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the court, in an opinion by Cardozo, C. J., held that no reasonable
opportunity had been offered the victim to separate himself from the
plant. "Continuity of cause has been so combined with contiguity in time
and'space that the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken as one."
[Emphasis added.] Thus the weight of the causal requisite overcame the
meager check of the "course" requirement. Later courts have accepted
this rationale with mixed emotions. Some tend to limit Charmette
strictly to its facts, evidently with a feeling akin to that in Lampert,
i.e., that the ramifications of any extension might be catastrophic. 12
However, others would extend Cardozo's reasoning and minimize the
"course" requirement to the extent that it is not so much where or when
the assault took place, as it is that the employment-originated controversy
subjected the employee to an unforeseen risk which brought about the
injury.13 The continuing cause concept has also been followed in cases
of off premises injury after abduction from the premises, 14 and a case
involving a claimant who chased a culprit from the premises and was
assaulted.15
A factual situation which would easily fit into the Charmette rationale
involves an off-premises assault of an employee by a striker or picket
during a labor dispute. However, it seems the Lampert anxiety has
carried the day in most of these cases; 16 compensation has been granted
only when the employment penumbra can be seen to follow the em-
ployee off the premises.' 7 Yet one recent case, in a well reasoned
opinion, broadened its application of the "course of", adopted the
Charmette deduction, and permitted compensation where the strikers
12 Collier's Case, 331 Mass. 374, 119 N.E.2d 191 (1954) (fifty-eight feet off
the premises); Dicks v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286 (1946)
(% mile from the place of employment); Magill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 250
App. Div. 813, 294 N.Y. Supp. 156 (3d Dep't), af'd per curiam, 275 N.Y. 568, 11
N.E.2d 757 (1937) (two months later while employee was off premises on lunch
hour); Morgan v. Hoage, 72 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir 1934) (assaulted preparing to go
to work); Maguire v. James Lees & Sons, 273 Pa. 75, 116 AUt. 679 (1922) (500
feet off premises, however this case was decided before Charmette). In McGrinder
v.. Sullivan, 290 N.Y. 11, 47 N.E.2d 421 (1943), the Board had refused compen-
sation since the claimant was four blocks from the premises. However, the court
held that the issue of continuation was a debatable one, but did not have the power
to change the Board's finding of fact. See Desmond, "Arising Out Of and In the
Course Of Employment" in New York, 26 NoTRE DAME LAW. 462, 470 (1951).
13 Scholl v. Industrial Coftn'n, 366 Ill. 588, 10 N.E.2d 360 (1937) (em-
ployee had responsibility of discharging others and was killed on way to work by
one whom he had discharged). See also Cain v. Paramount Theatres Corp., 286
App. Div. 907, 142 N.Y.S.2d 210 (3d Dep't 1955) (IS block from premises); Appel-
ford- v, -Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 296 N.W. 861 (1941) (few blocks).
14 R6yster v. McCoy, 293 P.2d 587 (Okla. 1956); Clark v. Industrial Comm'n,
356 IIl. 641, 191 N.E. 209 (1939).
15 Zolkover v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 13 Cal. 2d 584, 91 P.2d 106 (1939).
But see Burgess' Case, 331 Mass. 90, 117 N.E.2d 148 (1954).
16' Walsh v. Russeks Fifth Ave., 226 App. Div. 760, 41 N.Y.S.2d 145 (3d
Dep't 1943); Merz v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Ohio St. 36, 15 N.E.2d 632 (1938);
Enterprize Foundry Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 206 Cal. 562, 275 Pac.
432 (1929). See also Brown v. General Drivers Union, 212 Minn. 265, 3 N.W.2d
423 (1942).
17 Desmarais v. M.F.C. Shoring & Foundation Co., 264 App. Div. 964, 37
N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1942) (motor vehicle for transportation to work provided
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injured the employee after a long chase by car.18 This view reflects the
more sensible approach since few cases present a stronger example of
causal relation. The injured employee is performing a real service to
the employer by turning against the union, especially in a labor crisis.
A denial of compensation when the employee is performing such a service
merely because he is some little distance off the premises seems absurd.
Courts have made various other inroads on the "off-premises" rule
through numerous exceptions, based essentially on the ability of the
court to connect the employment in some way with the activity of the
assaulted employee off the premises. The required quantum of such con-
nection cannot be arbitrarily established due to the many factual situa-
tions which have arisen; it can only be seen in a case by case approach.
One exception involves cases embodying injuries received by the em-
ployee while "going or coming" to the place of employment. The pre-
dominant notion regarding such an injury is that it is not protected by
the act where no greater connection with the employment can be seen
other than that the employment requires the trip.' 9 However, when the
employee is asked to perform special services after the regular working
hours and is injured on the return trip home, the "course of" require-
ment has been held to be satisfied. 20 Also, where the employer provides
a motor vehicle for the journey, 21 or when he attempts to provide pro-
tection for the employee during a labor dispute, 22 the injury has been
compensable.
The exception involving the greatest number of off the premises
assault cases is that of an employee whose work necessarily includes
or entirely consists of off the premises activity, usually the traveling
man. The "in the course of" requirement is satisfied when the injury
occurs within the period of employment, at a place where the employee
may reasonably be and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the
duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.23 Probably the clearest example of this proposition is the em-
ployee who is sent off the premises by the employer with special instruc-
by the employer); Ruggles v. Ellen & Jefferys, 249 App. Div. 897, 292 N.Y. Supp.
635 (3d Dep't 1937) (employee sent to see company doctor); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. 58, 192 S.E. 325 (1937); Golden v. Marco Mfg. Co., 15 NJ.
Misc. 377, 191 Atl.. 290 (1937) (claimant delivered employer's goods to a point
out of danger of pickets and was injured while returning to place of work).
18 Baggett Transp. Co. v.. Holderfield, 260 Ala. 56, 68 So. 2d 21 (1953).
19 Collier's Case, 331 Mass. 374, 119 N.E.2d 191 (1954); Dicks v. Brooklyn
Cooperage Co., 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286 (1946); Appelford v. Kimmel, 297
Mich. 8, 296-N.W. 861 (1941).
20 Bobertz v. Board of Education, 134 N.J.L. 444, 48 A.2d 847 (1946), rev'd
on other grounds, 135 N.J.L. 555, 52 A.2d 827 (1947).
21 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 233. But see Jackson v. Wilson, 84 Ga.
App. 684, 67 S.E.2d 161 (1951).
22 Desmarais v. M.F.C. Shoring & Foundation Co., 264 App. Div. 964, 37
N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1942). See also Walsh v. Russeks Fifth Ave., 266 App.
Div. 760, 41 N.Y.S.2d 145 (3d Dep't 1943).
23 Foster v. Aines Farm Dairy Co., 263 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1953); 1 LARSON,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 193.
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tions and is injured.24 Also deliverymen, 25 traveling salesmen, 26 insur-
ance collectors,2 7 repair men,28 and taxi drivers29 fulfill the criterion
if assaulted in performance of their off-premises employment duties.
A favorable contrivance utilized by the employer to counteract these
exceptions is the defense of "deviation." Whenever the activity of the
employee while off the premises deviates from that which is in further-
ance of his employment, compensation may be denied for failure to
fulfill the requisite "course of" criterion.8 0 When this occurs some courts
confuse the usual conception of "in the course of" with the "arising out
of" criterion and hold that the assault occurring while the employee is
on this "deviation" has no causal connection with the employment, and
compensation is denied. Thus, when an assault results from the em-
ployee's misconduct while working,31 or from his deviation from the
employment to satisfy a personal desire, 32 the injury has been held
24 Weitz v. Weitz, 136 Pa. Super. 191, 7 A.2d 83 (1939); Nelson v. Service Oil
Co., 121 Neb. 762, 238 N.W. 525 (1931).
25 Foster v. Aines Farm Dairy Co., 263 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1953) (milkman
making deliveries); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 55 So.
2d 381 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 59 So. 2d 294 (1952) (laundryman); Sanders
v. Jarka Corp., 1 N.J. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948) (truck driver); Bluegrass Pastureland
Dairies v. Meeker, 268 Ky. 722, 105 S.W.2d 611 (1937) (milkman); Hardt v. City Ice
& Fuel Co., 109 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App. 1937) (employee transporting money to the
bank for the employer).
26 Scherr v. Siding & Roofing Sales Co., 305 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1957);
O'Connor v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 1956); Christian-
sen v. Hill Reproduction Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 24 (3d Dep't 1941),
afl'd per curiam, 287 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942); Dorfman v. Gottfried Oppen-
heimer, Inc., 261 App. Div. 859, 24 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1941); Connor Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 374 Ill. 105, 28 N.E.2d 270 (1940).
27 Stekolsky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 249 App. Div. 897, 292 N.Y. Supp.
565 (3d Dep't 1937).
28 Buckner v. Quick Seal, Inc., 233 Mo. App. 273, 118 S.W.2d 100 (1938).
29 Ramos v. Taxi Transit Co., 276 App. Div. 101, 92 N.Y.S.2d 744 (3d Dep't
1949), ajfd per curiam, 301 N.Y. 749, 95 N.E.2d 625 (1950); McLean's Case,
323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948); Yellow Cab Co. v. Wills, 199 Okla. 272, 185
P.2d 689 (1947).
30 1 LAusoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 265. However, the satisfaction of bodily
needs by a traveling man ought not be considered such a deviation. 1 LARSoN, op.
cit. supra, at 384; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(b) (1957). Contra, Barry v. Sanders
Co., 211 Miss. 656, 52 So. 2d 493 (1951).
31 Kendrick v. State Highway Board, 62 Ga. App. 570, 8 S.E.2d 793 (1940)
(assault resulted from salesman's conduct in forcing assailant's car from road)
However, this reasoning was not followed in Augelli v. Rolans Credit Clothing
Store, 33 NJ. Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439 (1954), where it was held that an em-
ployee's misconduct while driving did not remove him from the course of employ-
ment.
32 Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co., 141 Me. 288, 43 A.2d 718 (1945)
(employee's curiosity drew him off premises to investigate rifle shots); Hopper v.
Koenigstein, 135 Neb. 837, 284 N.W. 346 (1939) (serviceman repairing machinery
in a tavern drank heavily with a customer in the bar 'who later assaulted him);
Wimmer v. Hoage, 90 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (auto salesman, while taking a
prospective customer to view a truck, left auto in a state of intoxication to purchase
cigarettes). This last case is rather fargoing since there was evidence to show that
the salesman left the auto at the customer's request for cigarettes.* See also Chatman
v. Modern Builders, Inc., 86 So. 2d 350 (Miss. 1956) where the court could find no
causal. relation.because, inter alia, the fatal assault occurred in..the home of a truck
driver who had stopped for lunch.
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non-compensable because the "arising out of" requirement remains
unsatisfied. This confusion is easily understandable since the line between
the criteria is often indiscernible. "Course of" refers to employment.
"Arising out of" connects the employment with the injury. Once it is
found that an employee is no longer in the course of his employment, a
discussion of the "out of" criterion seems superfluous.
This difficulty of discernment has led some courts to question the
necessity of both criteria since "an accident rising out of an employment
almost necessarily occurs in the course of it, but the converse does not
follow."'33 One leading authority would merge both into a "work con-
nection" test which includes both criteria despite the fact that he feels
the present conception of "course of" is inappropriate.3 4
A total abandonment of the "course" criterion seems unlikely due to its
strong precedent and its specific inclusion in most of the statutes. How-
ever, the case law in the area reflects a general straining to circumvent the
harsh results of a strict adherence to the "course" test. The Charmette
rationale and the "zone of danger" rule directly attack a strict application
of the "off-premises" rule; the various exceptions to the rule make it a
nullity in the area of off-premises employment activity. Also, in virtually
every case of off-premises injury, the court will strain to find some em-
ployment activity to support an award. Yet when no such activity can be
seen or a "deviation" has occurred, compensation will be denied in most
jurisdictions even though the injury clearly arises "out of' the employ-
ment.
35
The Assault Factor
If the claimant is fortunate enough to pass the off-premises obstacle,
he is next confronted with the "arising out of" criterion in that his injury
was caused by the violent act of another. When first presented with this
problem, courts took a dim view of allowing recovery since they could
not be persuaded to penalize the innocent employer for another's wilful
act. However, today, virtually all jurisdictions have outgrown this
impression and will permit compensation as long as the assault can be
attributed to some facet of the employment. 36
The most prevalent theory of recovery in this area is through the use
of the "risk" principle. If it can be proven that the employment has
tinged the employee's activity with the danger of assault, recovery will
be granted. Early jurisprudence in this area required the danger of
assault to be an "increased risk." Risks peculiar to the employment were
differentiated from those common to the public, with compensation
being granted in the former case but not the latter. The majority of
33 Appelford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 296 N.W. 861, 862 (1941) (dictum). In
Buckner v. Quick Seal, Inc., 233 Mo. App. 273, 118 S.W.2d 100, 109 (1938), the
court said, "[I]t is difficult to conceive of an accident arising out of the employment
and not in the course of it."
34 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 442, 449 (1952).
35 See notes 12 and 16 supra.
36 Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 12
L. Soc. J. 179, 196-197 (1946).
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jurisdictions now consider this distinction obsolete,3 7 and hold that as
long as the employment created an actual risk from which the injury
flows, it is compensable. 38
The risk of assault may stem from the fact that the employee is
required to travel and brave certain "perils of the road." Consequently,
injuries resulting from altercations between truck drivers after an acci-
dent,3 9 a controversy regarding the mismanagement of motor vehicles,
40
an assault by a hitch hiker, 4 1 murder by a highwayman, 4 2 and even
from a passenger demonstrating wrestling holds on a train43 have been
compensable as being such "perils."
The nature of the work and its locale may also make the employee
susceptible to the danger of assault. One evident class of such employees
are those charged with keeping the peace. Since an assault is not an
uncommon occurrence in their employment, compensation is usually
allowed. 4 4 Also taxi drivers, 4 5 bill collectors and others required to
carry money on their persons, 4 6 and employees whose work requires
their presence in a tavern4 7 or other hazardous locale4 3 have been
compensated for resulting assaults.
37 However it does crop up occasionally. Scherr v. Siding & Roofing Sales Co.,
305 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1957); Thornton v. R.C.A. Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644,
221 S.W.2d 954 (1949); Lexington Ry. System v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d
467 (1939); Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (1938).
38 Pisapia v. Newark, 47 N.J. Super. 353, 136 A.2d 67 (1957); 1 LARSON, Op. cit.
supra note 3, at 74-75.
39 Sanders v. Jarka Corp., 1 N.J. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948).
40 Augelli v. Rolans Credit Clothing Store, 33 N.J. Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439
(1954). Contra, Kendrick v. State Highway Board, 62 Ga. App. 570, 8 S.E.2d 793
(1940). See also Goodland v. L.S. Donaldson Co., 227 Minn. 583, 36 N.W.2d 4
(1949).
41 Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936); Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 755, 172 S.E. 264 (1934). Contra, Beh v.
Breeze Corp., 2 N.J. 279, 66 A.2d 156 (1949).
42 State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 80 Colo. 130, 249
Pac. 653 (1926).
43 Buckner v. Quick Seal, Inc., 233 Mo. App. 273, 118 S.W.2d 100 (1938).
44 Town of Granite v. Kidwell, 263 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1953); Daugherty v.
City of Monett, 238 Mo. App. 924, 192 S.W.2d 51 (1946).
45 McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948); Yellow Cab Co. v.
Wills, 199 Okla. 272, 185 P.2d 689 (1947). But see Ramos v. Taxi Transit Co.,
276 App. Div. 101, 92 N.Y.S.2d 744 (3d Dep't 1949), aff'd per curiam, 301 N.Y.
749, 95 N.E.2d 625 (1950) where compensation was denied because the court saw
evidence of a personally motivated assault.
46 O'Connor v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 1956);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Stekolsky v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 249 App. Div. 897, 292 N.Y.S. 565 (3d Dep't 1937);
Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 109 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App. 1937); Hunt v. Gutzwiller
Baking Co., 104 Ind. App. 209, 9 N.E.2d 129 (1937).
47 Christiansen v. Hill Reproduction Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24
(3d Dep't 1941), aff'd per curiam, 286 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942). But see
Scherr v. Siding & Roofing Sales Co., 305 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1957) where
claimant could prove no unusual risk; Hopper v. Koenigstein, 135 Neb. 837, 284
N.W. 346 (1939) where even though the hazard had existed, the assault was caused
by the employee's relationship with a customer.
48 Gargano v. Essex County News Co., 129 N.J.L. 369, 29 A.2d 879, aff'd per
curiam, 130 N.J.L. 559, 33 A.2d 905 (1943) (employee required to walk through a
lonely street at a late hour); Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596,
297 N.W. 19 (1941) (two block walk to car at night in rougher section of town).
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Cases which need little elucidation regarding their work-connection
are those involving assaults on employees during labor disputes. Motive
for the assault is commonly found in the employee's refusal to adopt
union policy and his subsequent acceptance of work during a strike.
Under these conditions, an assault is an obvious hazard, and the "arising
out of" requirement is rarely disputed.4 9 As was stated above, however,
compensation may be denied for failure to satisfy the "course of"
requisite.
Courts have been somewhat reluctant to permit compensation awards
where the risk facet is not present. Except in the "perils of the road" and
hazardous location cases discussed above, compensation for assaults
which find their motivation in the personal affairs of the participants is
usually not granted since the resulting injuries are said to have no
relation to or origin in the employment. 50 Specific statutory prohibitions
exist in eight jurisdictions but their phraseology seems to bring them
within the usual rule.51 However, if it can be seen that the assault found
its cause in the work or the manner of performing it, compensation is
permitted since it may reasonably be termed "incidental to the em-
ployment."9 2 As can well be imagined, the nebulosity of this phrase
has created vague and conflicting precedent in its application; it can be
extended or contracted at the will of the court. Early courts gave it an
extremely strict construction with a view reflecting only the manner of
performing the work.53
A new theory regarding the phrase "incidental to employment" has
arisen which contemplates the work-environment with which the em-
ployee must cope. This theory was first proclaimed by Judge Cardozo in
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills,54 a case involving an injury to the
claimant due to the "horseplay" of a fellow servant. The court held that
"the claimant was injured ... because he was in a factory, in touch with
associations and conditions inseparable from factory life." Horseplay is
one of those conditions and is therefore another risk of employment.
49 See notes 16, 18 supra.
50 Foster v. Aines Farm Dairy Co., 263 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1953); Jackson v.
Wilson, 84 Ga. App. 684, 67 S.E.2d 161 (1951); Bluegrass Pastureland Dairies v.
Meeker, 268 Ky. 722, 105 S.W.2d 611 (1937).
51 The usual phraseology is: "shall not include an injury caused by the act of a
third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons
personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his
employment." ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262 (Supp. 1956); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011
(16) (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952); TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1956); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 72-104(b) (Supp. 1957).
Some states require the act causing injury to be wilful. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
2301 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (Supp. 1955); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.61(5)
(b) (1946). In Puerto Rico, compensation is denied when "caused to the workman
or employee by the criminal act of a third person . P. R. LAws ANN. tit. 11,
§ 5 (1955).
92 York v. City of Hazard, 191 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. App. 1946).
53 Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 292 Ill. 406, 127 N.E. 49 (1920); Stillwagon
v. Callan Bros., 183 App. Div. 141, 170 N.Y. Supp. 677 (3d Dep't), aff'd per curiam,
224 N.Y. 714, 121 N.E. 893 (1918).
54 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
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This work environment approach was accepted by Mr. Justice Rutledge
in formulating his "stress and strain" rule in Hartford Acc. & Indemnity
Co. v. Cardillo,5 5 a case involving an assault caused by one employee's
repeated use of the nickname "Shorty" when addressing another em-
ployee, which the other disliked. Rutledge's conception of employment
included the notion that work placed men under "strains and fatigue
from human and mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode
in myriads of ways . . . ."5 Employees do not discard their human
characteristics upon assuming employment; they are accompanied by the
normal human failings composited in human nature, e.g., personal
animosities, funmaking, emotional flare-ups, etc. Consequently, when
the accumulated pressure of work environment sets off a quarrel which
leads to an assault and injury, it may be compensable as finding its
cause in a risk of employment, despite the fact that the final cause is
personal. Employment has sufficiently contributed to the injury57
The Cardillo rationale has been met with mixed feelings. Some courts
refuse its reasoning58 or misconstrue it.59 Others not only accept it,60
but would extend it to formulate the "positional" or "but for" test for
compensation, whereby sufficient causal connection is found in the mere
fact that the employment requires the employee's presence at the place
of injury. 61 This is probably the furthest extension of the "arising out of"
requisite; however, its simple requirement of locality, when met, does
not preclude the establishment of other defenses by the employer, e.g.,
the aggressor defense, 62 and the "personal motivation" defense.63 On
the other hand the test would grant compensation in cases of assault by
an insane person,6 4 a robber,65 or simply for an assault the cause of
which cannot be shown.6 6 Formerly these claimants had been denied
55 112 F.2d 11 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
56 Id. at 17.
57 It seems that dicta in the Cardillo case would include compensation for
injuries resulting from such human characteristics as curiosity. This dicta was not
followed in Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co., 141 Me. 288, 43 A.2d 718 (1945).
But see Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W.2d 117 (1957) (dictum).
58 Goodland v. L.S. Donaldson Co., 227 Minn. 583, 36 N.W.2d 4 (1949);
Fried v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 192 Ga. 492, 15 S.E.2d 704 (1941). In
neither of these cases was the Cardillo case mentioned.
59 Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 59 So. 2d 294 (1952).
This court evidently considers the Cardillo holding as necessitating no causal relation
between injury and employment.
60 Augelli v. Rolans Credit Clothing Store, 33 N.J.Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439
(1954).
61 Pisapia v. Newark, 47 NJ.Super. 353, 136 A.2d 67 (1957); Livingston v.
Henry & Hall, 59 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1952).
62 Livingston v. Henry & Hall, supra note 61 at 895.
63 Pisapia v. Newark, 47 N.J.Super. 353, 136 A.2d 67, 68 (1957).
64 Thornton v. R.C.A. Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954 (1949).
65 Scott v. Shinn, 171 Tenn. 478, 105 S.W.2d 103 (1937).
66 Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956); May v.
Ozark Central Tel. Co., 272 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. App. 1954); Farris v. Yellow Cab Co.,
189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Bobertz v. Board of Education, 135 NJ.L.
555, 52 A.2d 827 (1947).
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compensation because it was felt that the employment's requirement of
presence was not a sufficient connection with the injury. Further, in the
case of unexplained assaults, the burden of proof is usually placed on
the claimant to show such connection. Consequently, when a factual
circumstance creates two inferences of equal weight, one for com-
pensation and the other for its denial, compensation has been denied. 67
The positional test would help strengthen the inference for recovery.
A review of the cases reflects the semantic difficulty the courts have
met in describing the degree of causal connection necessary for com-
pensation. Some courts speak of proximate cause when discussing this
connection, 68 while others phrase it as a contributing proximate cause.69
Another court completely rejects the proximate cause concept holding
that the new standard called for in the statute ("arising out of")
expresses a "factor of source or contribution rather than cause in the
sense of being proximate or direct."' 70 Consequently, other courts follow-
ing this reasoning, phrase the connection as "contributing cause. '7 1 This
latter expression seems to be consonant with the spirit of the acts, since
the term "proximate" connotes common law conceptions completely
foreign to the purpose of Workmen's Compensation. Yet the term
"contributory" does not definitively solve the difficulty of degree.
Despite the notable theoretical advances in the courts' treatment of
cases involving assaults, it must be noted that each extension is couched
in the terms of the rules used in prior cases. The Champlain, Cardilo,
and "positional test" cases continue to premise recovery on a "risk" of
employment. Progress has been made by extending the term "risk" to
include whatever wrong the court deemed necessary to compensate.
Nothing but the courts' own non-volition seems to impede further
extension.
The Aggressor Factor
Formerly, when it was found that the claimant was himself the
motivating actor in the assault, courts stamped him as an aggressor and
withheld compensation. The term aggressor, as it was first contemplated,
assumed much less of an act of aggression than a physical blow; verbal
epithets were sufficient to preclude recovery. 72 Most states have specific
statutory defenses precluding recovery where the injury is caused by the
employee's "wilful intent to injure another" or his "wilful misconduct."7 3
67 Hopson v. Hungerford Coal Co., 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948); A. N.
Campbell & Co. v. Messenger, 171 Va. 374, 199 S.E. 511 (1938).
68 Chatman v. Modern Builders, Inc., 86 So. 2d 350 (Miss. 1956); Hawkins v.
Portland Gas Light Co., 141 Me. 288, 43 A.2d 718 (1945).
69 Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (1938); Scott
v. Shinn, 171 Tenn. 478, 105 S.W.2d 103 (1937).
70 Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19, 21 (1941).
71 Francis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957);
Augelli v. Rolans Credit Clothing Store, 33 N.J. Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439 (1954).
72 Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 12
L. Soc. J, 179, 196-197 (1946).
73 See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 27.
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There seems- to -be a general constraint in litigating a, claim involving an
off-premises aggressor. The few cases which have been reported follow
the general rule. 74 However, other cases involving an "aggressor" reflect
a modern trend for compensation. An increasing number of jurisdictions
have found fault with the defense and have repudiated it.75 Many
jurisdictions retaining the defense have lightened its effect by requiring
something more than abusive language or an impusive first blow to
constitute aggression. 76 As is the usual case, some courts adhere to the
old rule.77
The recent growth in the number of jurisdictions rejecting the defense
(all within the last ten years) reflects the strength of the trend. On the
other hand, although the trend favors an abandonment of this defense,
there is no indication that the wilful assailant will be compensated. Each
jurisdiction, while renouncing the defense, affirms its intention to deny
compensation whenever it finds wilfulness. Where there is no statutory
provision, the "arising out of" criterion will work as a bar. However, a
premium is placed on the violence of the act and its antecedent deliber-
ation; a light blow will not be deemed wilful even in face of the statutory
defense.78
.The movement then is not to recompense the wrongdoer, but simply
to remove obsolete notions of common law not contemplated by the
framers of the act. Nowhere in the statute does the term "aggressor"
appear. For a court to use the term as an instrument to withhold
compensation on the theory that the claimant "got what he was looking
for" is to take a myopic view of the statute's purpose. This theory would
introduce again the preventive concept of "fault" or "blame," which is.
precisely contrary to the legislative intent. Rather, the court should
74 Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Cazebon, 11 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1942) (pro-
vocative words); Fried v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 192 Ga. 492, 15 S.E.2d
704 (1941) (although the aggressor defense was not mentioned, the facts indicate
that the claimant's abusive language motivated the assault); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Reed, 56 Ga. 58, 192 S.E. 325 (1937) (employee fired pistol first during labor
dispute); Wooley v. Minneapolis Equipment Co., 157 Minn. 428, 196 N.W. 477
(1923) (decedent started street brawl).
75 Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W.2d 117 (1957); Martin v.
Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J.Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789 (1957); Johnson v. Safreed,
273 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1954); Young v. Famous Trading Corp., 283 App. Div. 753,
128 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 307 N.Y. 901, 123 N.E.2d 254
(1954); Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 239 Minn. 307, 58 N.W.2d 731 (1953);
Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952); State Com-
pensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311
(1952); Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949); Newell v. Moreau, 94
N.H.. 439, 55 A.2d.476 (1947) (dictum). See also Village of Butler v. Industrial
Comm'n, 265 Wis. 380, 61 N.W.2d 490 (1953) (dictum); Willis v. Taylor, 137
Conn. 626, 79 A.2d 821 (1950); Rothfarb v. Camp Awnee, Inc., 116 Vt. 172, 71
A.2d 569 (1950).
76 Stulginsky v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 199 At. 653,
658 (1938). See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 127.
77 Armstead v. Sommer, 126 Ind. App. 273, 131 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (vile words);
Brister v. Barton & Rich Drilling Co., 297 P.2d 405 (Okla. 1956); Cater v.
)rravelers Ins. Co., 83 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1955) (the same rule applied in tort
cases to determine aggressor is used in Workmen's Compensation); Fischer v.
Industrial Comm'n, 408 Ill. 115, 96 N.E.2d 478 (1951) (tap on chest).
78 Johnson v. Safreed, 273 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1954).
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examine the factual situation to determine employment connection and
ought not cease its consideration at the first instance of aggression by
the claimant.
Conclusion
The off-premise and assault factors within this discussion present an
interesting interplay between both the "out of" and "course of" criteria
within the same litigation. The recent cases indicate great progress in
the treatment of the assault factor through the Cardillo rationale and
the new concept of the term "aggressor." On the other hand, the courts'
treatment of the off-premise factor and its general policy relative to the
"course of" requirement leave much to be desired.
It is evident that there has been a determined erosion of the traditional
poncept of the "course of" requirement in close cases where a strict
adherence would deny compensation. Indeed, one jurisdiction would
limit it to a mere aid in determining causal connection, 79 while another
removes it entirely and adds a new test.8 0 Still another jurisdiction by a
peculiar analysis would remove the requirement in cases of persons
assaulted because of their employment. 8 ' The present disagreement
(seems to be indicative of each court's philosophy of the acts. Those
undercutting the strict view of "course of" feel they are giving the
statute the liberal construction intended by its creators. Those advocating
the usual view believe the legislature alone should author such an exten-
sion.82 Current authorities look with disfavor upon the criterion's present
construction and question its necessity. 83 Most courts, however, have
adamantly retained the older theory, evidently motivated by the parade of
horribles seen in the Lampert case.8 4 The strong precedent of the major-
ity indicates a change is not forthcoming.
This is unfortunate since the prevalent view of "course of" would
apply the criterion as if it were in a vacuum, that is, with no relation to
its twin, "arising out of." Such a view seems inconsistent with reality
since the two at times are so inextricably interwoven as to appear in-
79 Rogers v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 85 Ohio App. 421, 88 N.E.2d 234
(1949), afl'd, 153 Ohio St. 513, 92 N.E.2d 677 (1950). See also Augelli v. Rolans
Credit Clothing Store, 33 N.J.Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439 (1954).
80 Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 72-104(a) (Supp. 1957). The test here is "in-
juries ...as a result of their employment." However subsequent language in the
statute qualifies the test to such an extent as to bring it within the usual conception
of "course of."
81 Lippman v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 79 N.D. 248, 55 N.W.2d 453
(1952). This statute, N.D. REv. CODE § 65-0102(8) (Supp. 1957), requires only the
"course of" criterion to be fulfilled; the "out of' requirement was omitted by
legislative policy. However, this court by judicial interpretation requires the ful-
fillment of what is usually considered the "out of" requirement alone for recovery
in this area.
82 See, e.g., Livingston v. Henry & Hall, 59 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1952)
(dissenting opinion).
83 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 451; Horovitz, supra note 2, at 777;
Rodes, Workmen's Compensation, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 146 (1956).
84 See note 12 supra.
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distinguishable. 85 Also, the basic purpose of the Act--compensation for
work-connected injury-would seem to warrant something more. There-
fore, a sensible approach would be to formulate a conception of "in, the
course of' which contemplates the "out of' criterion and may be vieweid
in its light.
Specifically then, a distinction within the criterion itself should first
be made. When a court is presented with a factual situation which in-
dicates that the activity of the employee is totally divorced from the
employment and any employment risk, the court ought then apply the
criteria separately. However, if it can be seen that the employment con-
templates the risk of injury when the activity of the employee is not in
furtherance of the employer's business, the contrary view should be
taken. For example, if A has the duty of discharging employees in X
firm, and immediately before leaving for a vacation in Florida, dis-
charges B, who in anger follows A to Florida and kills him, this injury
should be compensable. It is true that A's activity in Florida does not
aid X's business endeavors; however, when such activity is coupled with
the risk of assault engendered from the discharge, the activity should be
considered within the course of employment. The risk of injury, accom-
panying the employee from the usual hours and place of employment,
transforms his activity wherever he travels into "course of" activity,
the Lampert fear notwithstanding.8 6
The "out of" criterion should be treated similarly. This is exemplified
by the "positional test" now employed in a number of jurisdictions to
determine causality.8 7 This reasoning places great significance on the
employee's activity at the time of injury and would permit compensation
where the employment required the employee's presence at the place of
the injury. Similar reasoning is employed in those jurisdictions which
permit compensation when the employment presents a greater oppor-
tunity for the infliction of injury.88
One may question whether such extensions were contemplated by the
authors of the acts. The underlying purpose of the acts requires an
affirmative answer. The statutes were designed to compensate employees
whose injuries could be attributed to the system they served, regardless of
fault. Once this determination is made, the courts ought not develop
stringent rules which tend- to circumvent or deter the fruition of this
legislation.
William J. Harte
85 RIESENFELD, MODERN SOCAL LEGISLATION 235 (1950).
86 See Scholl v. Industrial Comm'n, 366 IM. 588, 10 N.E.2d 360 (1937).
87 See note 61 supra.
88 Todd v. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 Atd. 42 (1925). See also
Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 649 (1940). Rutledge predicates the environment of the employment as a
vital consideration in determining causal connection.
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